Sandbox review (Code node, T30 as deployed by T53)
The transform node runs the user's Python in Pyodide on Deno (src/extractit/nodes/code).
This review runs an escape battery against it and records what held.
What was run
tests/sandbox/test_sandbox_escape_battery.py (marker security_sandbox, make security-sandbox),
profile deno on macOS with the pinned Deno and Pyodide bundle. Every case starts from user code
that already got the real __import__ back through object.__subclasses__() (the import hook is
defense in depth, not the boundary, T30) and then tries one thing:
| Group | Cases | Result |
|---|---|---|
Network (fetch, listen, connect, WebSocket, DNS, remote import(), Python sockets and urllib) |
11 | refused (NotCapable / PermissionDenied, or no such API); a listening server of the host saw 0 connections |
Host files (read, list, write, create, mkdir, remove, chmod, symlink, realpath, stat, file:// import, /proc/self/environ) |
12 | refused; a sentinel file of the host is invisible through Python's virtual filesystem |
| Environment, subprocesses, FFI | 6 | refused; the host environment is not visible to Python (sentinel) |
| System information (hostname, OS release, interfaces, memory, load) | 5 | refused |
Permission escalation (Deno.permissions.request, query, Function constructor, Deno.kill) |
5 | requests answered denied; nothing granted |
Dedicated cases (cwd, os.system, Worker) |
3 | see the findings |
39 cases refused as expected, 3 dedicated cases (42 attempts) and 3 side-channel checks (host server, host file, host environment), with no Deno process left behind after any of them (an autouse fixture checks it on every test).
Findings
| Id | Severity | What | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| SEC-010 | info | Deno.cwd() answers. It names only the throw-away directory of the run (dx-sbx-…), never the project; the test asserts it. |
accepted, owner T30 |
| SEC-011 | info | os.system(...) does not raise inside Pyodide: it crashes the runner and the run ends SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE (fail closed; the command did not run). Creating a Worker hangs until the wall limit kills the run (SANDBOX_TIMEOUT). A worker inherits no permission. |
open (robustness: a clear error instead of a crash), owner T30 |
One case first looked like a miss and was a test artefact: fetch to port 9 is refused by the
fetch specification (bad port), before Deno's permissions are asked; the battery uses a normal port.
Not covered
- The
deno+gvisorprofile (container with runsc,--network none, read-only root) needs Linux and runsc. It was not run in T55. Its checks live intests/nodes/code/test_sandbox_deno.py(DX_SANDBOX=deno+gvisor) and must be run on the production host. - Side channels (timing, shared CPU) and kernel-level escapes of the host Deno process.
- Resource exhaustion beyond T30's own tests (memory, CPU, output, time).
- Pentest by a person: see Pentest checklist.
Conclusion for H8
On the deno profile Pyodide on Deno held against every attempt of the battery: the boundary is
Deno's permission model (no network, no host files, no environment, no subprocess, no FFI), not
Python. See ADR-015.